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Abstract 
Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of 
the relationship “all things considered better than”. This example invokes our intuitive 
preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of varying 
intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, 
entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of 
rationality.  
I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people evaluate 
episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why 
our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation 
should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be 
the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels’ and Temkin’s example does not 
provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity. 
 
Keywords: Acyclicity, rationality, similarity-based decision-making, heuristics and biases, pain 
evaluation. 
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Heuristics and Biases 
in a Purported Counterexample to the Acyclicity of “Better Than”. 
 
The acyclicity of “better than” requires that when an alternative a1 is better than a2, …, ai-1 is 
better than ai, …, an-1 is better than an, then an is not better than a1, irrespective of the length n of 
the chain. Acyclicity is a central principle of rational choice, as on a finite set of feasible 
alternatives, it is necessary for the existence of an alternative which is not worse than some 
alternative in that set.1 If, as standard rational choice theory holds, rationality requires not 
choosing an alternative that is worse than some other feasible alternative, then there is no basis 
for rational choice when acyclicity is violated. 
Recently, Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to 
the acyclicity of the relationship “all things considered better than”.2 This example invokes our 
intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of 
varying intensity and duration. Rachels and Temkin claim that these preferences are confidently 
held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should not regard acyclicity as a 
requirement of rationality. 
In this paper, I defend the acyclicity of “all things considered better than” against this 
example. No matter how intuitively and theoretically attractive a principle like acyclicity is, our 
attachment to it may be undermined by its lack of fit with considered and confidently held case 
judgments. I will argue, however, that the intuitive judgments evoked by Rachels’ and Temkin’s 
example should not be confidently held. I review their example in section 1. In section 2, I argue 
that it elicits the use of a heuristic known as “similarity-based decision-making”. I also argue that, 
together with the findings of recent research on the way people evaluate episodes of pain, the use 
of this heuristic explains why our intuitive preferences in this example may violate acyclicity.3 
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In section 3, I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with 
suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of incorrectly weighing the intensity of 
pain or the duration of pain in at least one of the comparisons that Rachels and Temkin ask us to 
make. 
 
 
1. 
 
Rachels and Temkin propose several counterexamples to acyclicity involving pains of varying 
intensity and duration. These examples are sufficiently similar that we can safely focus on only 
one of them. Imagine the prospect of living for a further substantial, fixed number of years T in 
good health and without any significant pain, except for the fact that you will have to endure a 
certain episode of pain Ei which will begin tomorrow. Assume that however bad this episode is, 
it is never so bad as to render the period T as a whole not worth living. To begin with, imagine 
that this episode is a significant, though compared to T relatively short, period of excruciating 
torture. Call this combination of intensity of pain and the time it must be endured E0. Now 
imagine enduring slightly less intense torture for much longer than the duration of the pain in E0. 
Call this combination of intensity of pain and the time it must be endured E1. Though the 
prospect of enduring E0 is awful, it will intuitively seem better, Rachels and Temkin claim, to 
endure E0 than to endure E1. Now consider E2, which involves suffering a pain slightly less 
intense than the pain in E1 for much longer than the duration of the pain in E1. Again, Rachels 
and Temkin argue, E1 seems intuitively better than E2. Now iterate this kind of reasoning and by 
so doing construct a sequence of two-dimensional alternatives E0 , E1 , …, EMILD  in which the 
final member EMILD involves a mild pain (such as the pain of a mild headache or a hangnail) for a 
long period of time which is less or equal to the time T you have left to live. It is possible, they 
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claim, to construct this sequence so that in the pairwise comparison of adjacent members, the 
slight alleviation of the intensity of pain always appears to be outweighed by the marked increase 
in its duration, so that each member in this sequence will be preferred to its successor. Now, 
Rachels and Temkin argue, if the period of excruciating torture is long enough, it is also 
intuitively preferable to endure a mild pain for a very long time than to face this significant period 
of torture, so that EMILD is intuitively better than E0. In sum, in pairwise comparison, each 
member of this sequence is preferred to its successor and the final member of this sequence is 
preferred to the initial member, violating acyclicity.4 Rachels and Temkin believe that even after 
reflection, it is perfectly reasonable to confidently regard E0 as better than E1, E1 as better than 
E2, etc. and EMILD as better than E0. They conclude that “all things considered better than” is not 
an acyclic relation. 
 Rachels and Temkin offer the following explanation for the purported failure of acyclicity 
in this case.5 Which features of a given alternative are relevant, and/or how significant these 
features are, may depend on which alternative it is being pairwise compared with. Consequently, 
though an alternative E0 may be better than E1 and E1 may be better than E2 in terms of the 
features that are relevant to these comparisons and the significance that these features have when 
making these comparisons, E0 need not be better than E2 in terms of the features of these 
alternatives that are relevant to that comparison or the significance that these features have in 
that comparison. Rachels and Temkin argue that their example involves precisely this kind of 
shift in the apparent relevance and/or significance of the features of the alternatives. The 
duration of a painful experience is of great importance, they argue, when we compare two 
experiences which differ only slightly in intensity. However, when we compare two experiences 
which differ greatly in intensity, the duration of the experience is not always so significant. 
Temkin puts this point as follows: 
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“In comparing pains that merely differ in degree, duration clearly plays a 
significant role. That is why we think that a shorter intense pain might clearly be 
better than a much longer less intense pain. But in comparing pains that differ in 
kind, duration plays a very different role. In comparison with torture of sufficient 
duration, a hangnail’s duration basically does not matter. So, a factor that is clearly 
relevant and significant in comparing some outcomes is not relevant—or at least 
has very different significance—in comparing different outcomes. Thus, 
[acyclicity] fails for reasons that are clear, straightforward, and, I think, perfectly 
appropriate.”6 
One natural response to this argument is to question the reliability of the intuitive 
judgments involved in the following way. The example involves very imprecisely described 
intensities of pain—except for the first few and last few members of the sequence, the intensities 
of pain are not described in absolute terms, but only in terms like “slightly less intense than the 
pain experienced in the preceding alternative”. Moreover, most people will have little to no 
experience of the intensities of pain under discussion. The durations involved are also imprecisely 
indicated. This lack of clarity about the nature of the alternatives helps obscure that the 
construction of a sequence of the kind Rachels and Temkin have in mind is less straightforward 
than it may first appear to be. For if one makes the differences in intensity of pain between 
adjacent members of this sequence very small in order to render the preference for the earlier 
member compelling, then it will take a great many steps to arrive at a mild pain, and the durations 
one would need to invoke in the final members of the sequence will be longer than we can 
properly appreciate. On the other hand, if one makes the differences in intensity of pain 
sufficiently large to get from excruciating torture to mild pain in a number of steps that is small 
enough to ensure that the durations involved are not excessive, then the case for always 
preferring the earlier member of any two adjacent members of the sequence may not be 
 6 
compelling. Since we have insufficient evidence to believe that we have confidently held 
preferences in this case that violate acyclicity, this response concludes, we have insufficient 
grounds for abandoning acyclicity.7 
I am sympathetic to this response. However, it leaves unexplained several striking 
features of some people’s experience when confronted with this example. First, it leaves 
unexplained why we may feel intuitively drawn to express preferences with a high degree of 
confidence over alternatives which are so vaguely described and the features of which are so 
unfamiliar to us. This is striking, because it might seem more natural for us simply to state that 
we have no idea how we would evaluate such alternatives. Second, it leaves unexplained why we 
may feel drawn to believe that it will be possible to construct a sequence over which these 
intuitive preferences will violate acyclicity without making use of inordinately long periods of 
time. (For example, I believe one could easily imagine having cyclical preferences of the 
hypothesized kind over a sequence like the one outlined in Table 1—where the final episode lasts 
for around 39 years.) Third, it does not account for Rachels’ and Temkin’s explanation of this 
violation of acyclicity in terms of the apparently changing relevance and/or significance of the 
two features of the alternatives in question. 
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Table 1. An imaginary example of a sequence of the Rachels-Temkin kind. 
Attributes Episodes 
Intensity of pain* Duration in weeks 
E0 20    1 
E1 18    2 
E2 16    4 
E3    14.5    7 
… … … 
E21      2.0  650 
E22      1.5 1100 
EMILD      1.0 2050 
* This is assumed to be a cardinal scale. 
 
I believe these facts can be explained by turning to recent work on two topics in intuitive 
decision-making: similarity-based decision-making and the evaluation of painful experiences. I 
will discuss each in turn. 
 
 
2. 
 
Ariel Rubinstein’s influential characterization of similarity-based decision-making runs as 
follows.8 When deciding between multi-dimensional alternatives, say bundles of pain-intensity 
and the time it must be endured (pi, ti) and (pj, tj), a decision-maker goes through the following 
three-stage procedure: 
Stage 1: The decision-maker looks for dominance. If pi < pj and ti < tj, then bundle 
(pi, ti) is preferred to bundle (pj, tj).  
Stage 2: The decision-maker looks for similarities between pi and pj and between ti 
and tj. If she finds similarity in one dimension only, she determines her preference 
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between the two pairs using only the dimension in which there is no similarity. 
For example, if pi is similar to pj while ti is not similar to tj, and ti<tj , then bundle 
(pi, ti) is preferred to bundle (pj, tj). 
Stage 3: The choice is made using an unspecified different criterion.  
Recent tests have yielded significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that people make 
decisions in this way or in closely related ways in a variety of choice situations including gambles 
(with prizes and the probability of winning them as dimensions of the alternatives), the choice of 
applicants (where the dimensions were taken to be “intellectual ability”, “emotional stability”, and 
“social facility”), inter-temporal trade-offs (where the dimensions were time and money), and the 
choice of jobs (where the dimensions were commuting time and the wage level).9 
Subjects are hypothesized to use similarity-based decision-making because it simplifies 
decision-making in various ways. First, by using information on similarities and differences, it 
draws on easily accessible knowledge. Similarity appears to be among the features of objects that 
are routinely and automatically registered by the perceptual system; we also appear to be better 
attuned to the evaluation of differences than to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes.10 Second, 
by placing intra-dimensional evaluation before the possible use of inter-dimensional evaluation, 
the procedure makes use of the fact that intra-dimensional evaluation is simpler, because it 
involves comparisons between features of alternatives that are expressed in the same units.11 
Finally, it ensures that it will be immediately apparent when an alternative is slightly better than 
another along all relevant dimensions, a fact which might be obscured if the overall goodness of 
each alternative was first evaluated independently.12 
Though similarity-based decision-making will not necessarily yield preferences that violate 
principles of rational choice, the use of similarity-based decision-making can explain a wide range 
of violations of axioms of orthodox decision theory, including violations of acyclicity.13 It is, for 
example, a common explanation for why experimenters manage to get subjects to reveal cyclic 
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preferences when they present subjects with a sequence of pairwise choices between multi-
dimensional alternatives with the following properties: (i) each alternative in the sequence is 
always slightly better than its predecessor along the first dimension and markedly worse along the 
other dimension(s); (ii) when the difference between alternatives along the first dimension is 
substantial, this dimension becomes especially significant. In a sequence of this kind, when 
someone using similarity-based decision-making compares adjacent alternatives, the slight 
improvement along the first dimension always appears to be outweighed by the marked 
worsening along the other dimension(s), so that each alternative is preferred to its successor in 
the sequence. However, the same person, when comparing the initial and final alternatives in the 
sequence will find that the sequence of slight improvements along the first dimension adds up to 
a substantial improvement along that dimension. Given the hypothesized importance of the first 
dimension when alternatives differ markedly along it, this substantial difference along the first 
dimension intuitively outweighs the large cumulative worsening along the other dimension(s), so 
that the final alternative is preferred to the initial alternative. 
An experiment of Amos Tversky’s can serve as an example. Tversky asked students at 
Harvard University to make pairwise choices between potential applicants who were 
characterised by their percentile ranks along three dimensions, “intellectual ability” (I), 
“emotional stability” (E), and “social facility” (S).14 During the experiment, subjects were asked to 
make pairwise choices between the candidate profiles presented in Table 2, among others. The 
results indicated a significant proportion of subjects violated acyclicity, favouring earlier over later 
profiles when choosing between adjacent profiles in the sequence a, b, c, d, e—because the 
difference in intellectual ability between adjacent profiles appeared slight, and the difference in 
the other dimensions substantial—while also favouring e over a—because when the difference in 
intellectual ability was substantial, this was taken to be decisive, intelligence being considered the 
most important characteristic for entry to the university. 
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Table 2. Candidate profiles for one of Tversky’s experiments. 
Dimensions Candidate profiles 
I E S 
a 69 84 75 
b 72 78 65 
c 75 72 55 
d 78 66 45 
e 81 60 35 
 
It is easy to see why Rachels’ and Temkin’s example may elicit the use of similarity-based 
decision-making in the pairwise comparison of adjacent alternatives in their sequence E0, E1, E2, 
…, EMILD. First, given the characterisation of the intensity of pain in each member of the 
sequence as “just slightly less than” the intensity of pain in the preceding member of the 
sequence, adjacent alternatives may well be regarded as similar along the intensity of pain 
dimension, while the marked increase in duration as we move through the sequence ensures that 
they will be experienced as dissimilar along the duration of pain dimension. Second, the 
information provided invites the use of similarity-based decision-making, since with the 
exception of the first and final members of the sequence, we are offered only rough information 
about the differences in the intensity and duration of pain between adjacent members, and are 
therefore not informed about the absolute intensity and duration of pain involved in the 
intermediate alternatives. (Though even if we were offered a more precise description of the 
alternatives, we would still be disposed to rely on perceptions of similarity and on our evaluations 
of differences, which are easily accessible, rather than on our appreciation of absolute magnitudes 
of intensity of pain and the length of time it must be endured, about which we feel less certain.) 
Third, we might be drawn to similarity-based decision-making because it enables us to avoid the 
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difficult task of specifying precisely how we should make trade-offs between the intensity of pain 
and its duration. 
Similarity-based decision-making would, of course, lead one to always prefer the earlier of 
any two adjacent alternatives in Rachels’ and Temkin’s sequence, which is in line with Rachels’ 
and Temkin’s claims about our intuitive preferences. It would not, however, lead to any particular 
choice between E0 and EMILD. What does psychological theory have to say about this choice? 
Recent studies indicate that the relative weight given to the intensity of pain and its duration in 
the intuitive evaluation of painful episodes depends markedly on the attention directed towards 
each of these two attributes, and on their evaluability, with the weight given to an attribute 
increasing in both the amount of attention directed to it and its evaluability.15 They also indicate 
that when subjects’ attention is not specifically directed to duration, and its contribution to the 
badness of a painful episode is not made especially easily evaluable, it is given very little weight. 
In an experiment carried out by Donald Riedelmeier and Daniel Kahneman, for example, 
patients undergoing a colonoscopy reported the intensity of pain every 60 seconds during the 
procedure and subsequently provided an evaluation of the total pain suffered during the episode. 
Each patient underwent one procedure; the length of the procedures varied from 4 to 66 
minutes.16 The task of evaluating the level of pain at regular intervals, coupled with significant 
changes in the intensity of pain during the procedure, focused patients’ attention on the intensity 
of pain. Moreover, the task of regularly evaluating the intensity of pain rendered the intensity of 
pain easily evaluable by the end of the episode. By contrast, within the context of the experiment, 
no subject rated or experienced procedures of different durations. In their global evaluations of 
each episode, subjects displayed a phenomenon known as “duration neglect”: the duration of 
experiences had little or no independent effect on the way they were evaluated. Instead, subjects 
appeared to evaluate these episodes by a constructed “representative moment”: a collage of the 
intensity of pain at several singular instants, including the peak and end of the episode.17 Since the 
 12 
duration of the episode is not included in this representation, duration was neglected in its overall 
evaluation. 
Duration neglect does not occur, however, in contexts of choice which direct attention 
towards duration and which render it more easily evaluable. This was illustrated by a series of 
experiments in which subjects were each exposed to several episodes that contained various 
unpleasant experiences which differed significantly along three dimensions: duration, intensity, 
and the direction of intensity over time (increasing, decreasing, or oscillating). The fact that each 
subject experienced episodes of markedly different duration drew some attention to duration and 
rendered it more easily evaluable, since it offered subjects points of comparison in terms of 
duration. In these experiments, subjects appeared to rely on a kind of “anchoring and 
adjustment” heuristic in evaluating episodes: they took the aforementioned representative 
moment as a base for their evaluation, and then made significant, but relatively small adjustments 
to this base to account for the episodes’ duration.18 
It is noteworthy that subjects whose evaluation of painful episodes is heavily determined 
by their assessment of a representative moment will have preferences that violate normative 
principles for the evaluation of painful episodes. One such principle is temporal monotonicity, 
which holds that adding a period of pain to a given painful episode should make it worse. This 
principle is violated by such subjects, because they will judge a shorter episode of pain as worse 
than a longer episode of pain which contains all the painful experiences of the shorter episode 
with some additional painful experiences, but which ends on a less unpleasant note.19 This means 
that preferences expressed in contexts that elicit duration neglect or the use of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic should be regarded with suspicion. 
Duration can be expected to be given greater weight than in the anchoring and 
adjustment model when subjects are asked to compare experiences that are similar on all 
dimensions other than duration. For the alternatives’ similarity in all other dimensions will make 
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duration highly salient, and also render differences in duration easily evaluable.20 (This conclusion 
is, of course, consistent with the use of similarity-based decision-making in such cases.) 
What follows from these findings for our analysis of Rachels’ and Temkin’s thought 
experiment? In comparing E0 and EMILD, our attention will undoubtedly focus on duration, and it 
will therefore be given significant weight. However, duration will not be as salient or as easily 
evaluable as it is in the choice between adjacent alternatives in Rachels’ and Temkin’s sequence. 
Duration can therefore be expected to receive relatively less weight in the choice between E0 and 
EMILD than it does in the choices between adjacent alternatives. This explains why it may be 
possible to generate a sequence of the required kind: while duration may always have sufficient 
weight in the comparison of adjacent alternatives to render the earlier alternative preferable, the 
diminished relative weight of duration in the comparison of E0 and EMILD means that it may not 
have sufficient weight to render E0 preferable to EMILD. 
 Together, then, similarity-based decision-making and recent research on the evaluation of 
painful episodes can explain people’s responses to Rachels’ and Temkin’s example. They explain 
why we may feel intuitively drawn to express preferences with some degree of confidence over 
alternatives which are so vaguely described and the features of which are so unfamiliar to us: in 
order to come up with a judgment, the forms of intuitive decision-making that the example elicits 
do not really make use of the information that is left out, or that we feel uncertain about. 
Furthermore, they explain the phenomenology of evaluation that Rachels and Temkin describe, 
in terms of the shifting weight of duration and intensity of pain in our decision-making. This 
shifting weight is, of course, also the reason why we may find it possible to construct a sequence 
in which our intuitive preferences violate acyclicity. 
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3. 
 
Imagine that our preferences over some set of precisely described alternatives display the pattern 
that Rachels and Temkin envisage. I believe that if the aforementioned explanation of our 
preferences is correct, we should regard some of our intuitive preferences with suspicion. 
 First, a person using similarity-based decision-making while comparing two adjacent 
alternatives Ei and Ei+1 does not first consider how bad it would be to endure Ei and then how 
bad it would be to endure Ei+1, and then judge the former less bad than the latter. Instead, 
alternatives are compared aspect-by-aspect, with the dissimilar aspect always proving decisive. 
Thus, the decision-maker never explicitly considers how to trade off duration against intensity of 
pain, or how these two aspects together contribute to the overall badness of an alternative. 
Finally, the lack of attention directed at intensity of pain in pairwise comparisons may imply that 
this dimension is being underweighted in some pairwise comparisons.21 These considerations cast 
doubt on the validity of our intuitive preferences between adjacent alternatives in Rachels’ and 
Temkin’s sequence. 
Second, the surprisingly small role of duration in the overall evaluation of painful 
episodes in some contexts of choice indicates that there is a distinct possibility that duration will 
be underweighted in the choice between E0 and EMILD. 
 These worries about the trustworthiness of some of our intuitive preferences should 
increase once we realise that our preferences will also violate the principle of invariance, which 
requires that two versions of the same choice problem that are recognized as equivalent when 
shown together should elicit the same response when shown separately.22 For suppose we are 
asked to evaluate each painful episode Ei as follows:  
“Imagine that you have two possible futures. The first is to live for precisely 
another T years in good health and without experiencing any significant episode 
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of pain except for the fact that, starting tomorrow, you will have to experience 
episode Ei.
23 The second is to live for time Ti* in good health and without having 
to experience Ei or any other significant episode of pain. How long would Ti* 
have to be to render you indifferent between these two futures?24 
You may refuse to answer if you feel unable to come up with an answer you 
regard as even somewhat reliable.” 
This question is a variant of a method of assessing the value of health states known as the 
Time Trade-off Method. This method is widely accepted in health economics because, compared 
to other methods of eliciting people’s evaluations of health states, it performs relatively well on 
the following four central criteria: feasibility (since subjects are generally capable of answering 
questions of this type), discriminative power (since subjects are able to discriminate health states 
that differ only slightly), reliability (since subjects tend to give similar answers when asked the 
question again) and validity (since tests indicate that it accurately reflects the concept it is 
intended to measure).25 It is therefore regarded by many as a practical gold standard of health 
state assessment.26 It is also a particularly good measure for our purposes, since answers to this 
question will probably not suffer from the two biases associated with the initial presentation of 
the decision problem. Unlike similarity-based decision-making, it requires us to engage in a global 
evaluation of the badness of each episode separately.27 This global evaluation is carried out in 
terms of a quantity that we will probably be familiar with and which we are used to making 
choices about, since our lives regularly involve choices which trade off particular goods against 
the time we can expect to spend in a pain-free state of full health. Second, because the question 
requires us to work with duration, this aspect of the episodes will appear salient to us and be 
rendered more easily evaluable. This will prevent the underweighting of duration associated with 
methods of evaluation that give a representative moment from the episode great weight. For 
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these reasons, I will assume that asking the Time Trade-off question is a legitimate way of 
eliciting a person’s preferences in this case. What can we learn from our attempts to answer it? 
Suppose first that, perhaps after some practice, we are capable of answering the Time 
Trade-off question for all alternatives. On this measure, an episode Ei will be better than an 
episode Ej if and only if Ti* is greater than Tj*. Since the resulting ordering must be transitive, at 
least one of the pairwise preferences generated by this way of evaluating the same alternatives will 
therefore be different from the pairwise preferences expressed in the initial presentation of the 
alternatives. The location of this difference or these differences will be informative. If the only 
differences are located among adjacent alternatives, then this suggests that similarity-based 
decision-making led us to undervalue the intensity of pain attribute in our choices between these 
alternatives. If, by contrast, the Time Trade-off measure agrees with all our initial preferences 
over adjacent alternatives, and differs only in the assessment of E0 and EMILD, then this suggests 
that we underweighted duration in that choice, and that similarity-based decision-making may 
even have helped us avoid underweighting duration in our other choices. Finally, if the Time 
Trade-off measure disagrees with some of our initial preferences between adjacent alternatives 
and with our initial preference between the first and final alternative, then this suggests that our 
initial decision-making was subject to both aforementioned biases, and that we underweighted 
the intensity of pain in some choices, and underweighted duration in another choice. 
 Suppose now, by contrast, that we are unable to answer the Time Trade-off question for 
some alternatives, because we do not feel that we can accurately globally evaluate some of the 
alternatives. Since we would now express no preference over some of the alternatives whereas we 
did express such a preference in the initial presentation of the example, our preferences will again 
violate invariance. Moreover, our inability to assess some alternatives would suggest that our 
initial preferences involving these alternatives were induced by the fact that the initial 
presentation of the decision-problem enabled us to avoid such global evaluation, instead allowing 
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us to proceed in the comparison of adjacent alternatives by intra-aspect evaluation only (as in 
similarity-based decision-making), or, in the comparison of the first and last alternatives, by a 
mental representation of the alternatives that focused our attention inordinately on the intensity 
of pain involved in each alternative. We should conclude that we do not really know whether 
these alternatives are better or worse than other alternatives. 
Acyclicity’s intuitive appeal and its central role in the theory of choice imply that one 
requires considered, confidently held case judgments that violate acyclicity before one can have 
sufficient grounds for rejecting it. The preceding considerations establish, I believe, that the 
intuitive preferences elicited by Rachels’ and Temkin’s example should not be held with a high 
degree of confidence. For we know that they may be the result of one or more well-documented 
biases, and that they will differ from the preferences revealed via a method of preference 
elicitation that is regarded by experts as among the most reliable of health state evaluation 
methods. The intuitive preferences elicited by this example should not, therefore, count as 
grounds for rejecting acyclicity. 
Interestingly, psychological research indicates that even if we are persuaded by this 
argument about the unreliability of our initial preferences in Rachels’ and Temkin’s example, this 
may not modify our gut feelings about this example. As Kahneman notes, the operation of 
intuitive methods of decision-making is typically “fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and 
difficult to control or modify”, and the judgments that these methods generate may therefore be 
hard to shake off.28 The pull of our initial preferences in this case may therefore be strong and 
persistent. It is, nonetheless, a pull we should resist.29 
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